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The Civil War in Afghanistan
General Major A. Liakhovsky
ABSTRACT
Author analyses (a) the causes leading to the Afghan Civil War 1979-
1989 (the war is above all the result of global rivalries between the super-
power states and conflicting political systems); (b) Politburo decision to
send Soviet troops into Afghanistan (there is reason to believe that the
leaders of the Soviet Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation,
skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies); (c) the deploy-
ment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (brought about an intensification of
the internal Afghan conflict, and brought about an abrupt international
reaction, especially from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the
Islamic world and China); (d) combat operations (the Soviet troops con-
ducted mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very limited
forces and equipment); (e) the national reconciliation policy and with-
drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (A civil war should end through
consensus within a given society. Such a consensus has not been
achieved in Afghanistan to this day, and therefore the war continues); (f)
the Civil War without Soviet troops (After Soviet troops departed, the scale
of fighting between the Afghans themselves increased);  and provides (g)
summations and conclusions (The Afghan conflict facilitated the defeat of
the USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation between the two
super-powers, socio-political systems, and military blocs. One million men
passed through Afghanistan. The dead numbered 14,626. About 50,000
men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, and over 500,000 contracted
various severe illnesses. In addition, 147 tanks, 1,312 armored vehicles,
233 artillery guns and mortars, 114 airplanes and 322 helicopters were
lost).
Causes for leading to the Civil War
The causes of the Civil War in Afghanistan can be condition-
ally subdivided into internal and external, objective and subjective
causes, although they are, of course, interconnected.
During the last two decades, events in Afghanistan have
brought this country, one of the most backward and poorest
nations of the world, increased attention from the international
community. The contentious situation arose in Afghanistan during
the mid-1970s, immediately after Prince Mohammed Daud in
1973 overthrew King Zahir Shah, abolished the monarchy and
proclaimed himself president of the republic. Supporters of the
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deposed king, as well as representatives of leftist forces and
Islamic fundamentalists, initiated the struggle against Daud.
Afghani-Soviet relations at the time were good. By 1978, there
were over two thousand Soviet technical, economic, and military
advisers in Afghanistan. The total sum of Soviet loans reached a
level of 1.265 million dollars, while American loans and non-
returnable grants reached a total of 470 million dollars.
The situation in the country noticeably deteriorated following
the military coup in April 1978 carried out by a relatively small
group of people with the support of the army and certain lower
middle class elements. As a result of this adventurism and volun-
taristic action, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) was proclaimed. And although the Soviet Union was not
directly involved in the revolution (it appeared to Soviet represen-
tatives in Kabul like “a bolt from the blue”), in the USSR such a
turn of events was welcomed with satisfaction—even more so
since the members of the PDPA proclaimed a policy of establish-
ing socialism in the country. This, in fact, set the tone for overall
aid and support to the new regime from the Soviet leadership.
From that moment Afghanistan found itself drawn into the
orbit of the fierce confrontation that marked the apex of the “Cold
War” between two different socio-political systems. This is pre-
cisely what makes it possible to explain the importance attached
to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the United States, as well
as other countries. In my article, I will briefly examine some
aspects of this conflict, its results and the lessons learned.
At first (after the military coup), the US administration did not
have a unified approach to the situation in Afghanistan. However,
the US national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, convinced
the administration that although growing Soviet influence in the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) did threaten US
national security, the situation also provided a valuable political
opportunity for the Americans in their global conflict with the
USSR. As stated specifically in a paper submitted to the State
Department: “…the overthrow of the DRA would show the rest of
the world, especially the ’Third World,’ the fallacy of the Soviet
concept of the inevitable socialist course of history.”1
The US, having accused the USSR of exporting revolution,
began to exert pressure on the latter, inducing it to abandon sup-
port of the DRA and make concessions in a series of other issues.
After the situation created in Afghanistan as a result of the military
coup had been discussed during the May (1978) session of
NATO, and upon consulting with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, that
summer the White House already took concrete steps to destabi-
lize the state of affairs in the DRA.
At the same time, political priorities in the region and the


























ed to expand cooperation with various Arab states and with
Beijing, and then with Pakistan. Great efforts were undertaken
during this period to induce the governments of the Arab states to
pay less attention to local problems, including to their relations
with Israel. In February 1979, President Carter declared that the
Americans are prepared to protect their vital interests by any
means, including military force, be it in the Near East or anywhere
else.
Most countries in the West, their allies in the Islamic world and
also China, reacted negatively, even with hostility, to events in
Afghanistan. They saw in them the threat of a shift in the regional
balance of power to the advantage of the USSR.
The new leaders in Afghanistan, on coming to power, began
to introduce radical transformations in the country and implement
an impractical maximalist course. In a feudal society with deep-
rooted remnants of a gentile-tribal order and the domination of
Islam in all spheres of life, they proclaimed their intentions to
establish socialism in the shortest possible period, for which there
was neither a social nor an economic basis, nor mass support.
Concentrating their main efforts in three basic directions – the
agricultural sector, the national question and religion – they
ruined the system of village management, shaped over the cen-
turies, exacerbated ethnic tensions and provoked a harsh negative
reaction from the clergy.
The new government also proved incapable of responding to
the expectations of the broad masses of the population and enlist-
ing their support. The land and water reforms, as well as transfor-
mations in the social field, had a piecemeal nature and did not
take into consideration the specific aspects of Afghan society. The
government committed the grossest errors and leftist deviations in
the socio-economic sphere, in ethnic issues and with regard to
religion. This pushed the population into the opposition camp.
Leaning on support from the Soviet Communist Party, the
leadership of the PDPA was able to impose its will upon the peo-
ple and to take a line of action towards establishing an authori-
tarian regime in Afghanistan based on fear and coercion.
However, in this country, with its traditional democratic liberties,
this could not but encounter fierce resistance from the population.
It was precisely the errors permitted by the PDPA’s leaders, who
had strove to achieve quick results through radical reforms and
force, that brought about civil war in Afghanistan.
It soon became evident that the government was in no condi-
tion to secure control over the situation in the country, even more
so since it did not have firm support in the armed forces, and
desertion became widespread.
The military coup brought about a breakdown in the balance


























voked a new spiral of tense rivalry between the US and the USSR,
since it was regarded by the Americans as having reinforced the
Soviet Union’s position in this region.
To settle the conflicts that had arisen in Afghan society, and to
avert civil war, it would have been necessary to pursue a flexible
policy, based on the traditions and customs of the Afghans, which
would have taken into account the real situation in Afghanistan
and the distribution of forces both in the country and on the inter-
national scene. But this the members of the PDPA could not
ensure.
In a situation of political disorder and internal party strife, the
general secretary of the PDPA, N.M. Taraki, was soon removed
from the post of president and killed. “His faithful disciple” H.
Amin, a man with avanturistic leanings, a dubious political profile
and external ties, demoralized the party and isolated the regime
from the people even more once he seized power through harsh
repression.
This created conducive conditions for setting the opposition
forces into action, as the latter immediately established ties with
Islamic states and the USA. With external support, rebel fighting
units began to form, relying on politically backward peasants and
artisans. The Muslim clergy, having been subjected to persecution
by the Amin regime, assumed a hostile stance. Disturbances
broke out among the tribes whose interests and historical tradi-
tions the government had not considered. Thousands of refugees
began to flow into Pakistan – and, partially, into Iran.
Rebel military camps sprang up in Pakistan. These became a
military and political base for the Afghan counter-revolution, and
from them new and increasingly larger armed units were sent into
Afghanistan. Through Pakistan, the rebels received increasing
amounts of American, as well as Chinese and other arms, and as
diverse aid from Western and Islamic countries.
The Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan
Under conditions of growing tension in and around
Afghanistan, the Afghan leaders began to send appeals for assis-
tance to the DRA, which would entail the direct use of Soviet
troops. They were delivered personally during meetings between
the leaders of the two countries, through Soviet representatives in
Kabul, and also during visits of top-level party and government
delegations.
In such circumstances, the Afghan leadership frequently
turned to the Soviet Union, requesting military aide through the
deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The first such appeal
was made by N. M. Taraki in March 1979, during the Herat upris-
ing, when he arrived in Moscow and met with the leaders of the

























time categorically rejected. The Soviet leaders acted similarly on
subsequent occasions as well. Yet in December their position
regarding the deployment of troops changed, because Brezhnev
changed his opinion. True, it should be said that his views were
not shared by some members of the Politburo of the Soviet
Communist Party’s Central Committee, first of all not by A.
Kosygin, nor by a number of top General Staff officials (N.B.
Ogarov, V.I. Varennikov), and not by the head of the ground
forces, I. G. Pavlovsky.
Deployment of Soviet troops was based on a corresponding
article (Article 4) existing in the Afghan-Soviet agreement (1978)
and also on the fact that the request by the Afghan government
and its acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union was exclusive-
ly a matter between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the two of
which could, by joint agreement, regulate their mutual relations.
Just as any other member of the UN, they had the right not only
to individual but also to collective self-defense, as provided by
Article 51 of the UN Charter.
At that time, the Soviet leadership long refused to act on the
appeal of the Afghans to dispatch Soviet troops to Afghanistan.
Yet on December 12, 1979 a positive decision in this matter was
nonetheless made. The decision was taken against a background
of contradictory, rapidly changing, and acute factors that directly
effected the Soviet Union’s state security interests. The last straw
that tipped the balance in favor of troop deployment was a deci-
sion made by the NATO foreign and defense ministers during their
December 12 summit in Brussels. They had approved a scenario
involving the deployment of new American “Cruise” and
“Pershing-2” mid-range missiles in Western Europe. By moving
arms to Western Europe, they could strike at the territory of the
Soviet Union. In the opinion of Soviet leaders, after this step
NATO no longer had anything to lose. However, as the further
events showed, the action in question, taken without appropriate
predictions and considerations of the effect that the deployment of
Soviet troops would have on development of the situation in and
around Afghanistan, brought tragedy to both sides.
While examining the issue of Soviet troop deployment in
Afghanistan, it should be noted that the realities and the evalua-
tions of the international situation at the time without doubt effect-
ed the elaboration of Soviet policy in regard to the DRA. Analysis
of the international situation at the end of the 1970s shows that it
was characterized by extreme tension. This was a period when
détente was abandoned, when the world was being drawn into a
new escalation of arms build-ups, when the West launched wide-
scale activities to undermine the USSR and its allies. The “Cold
War” was on. Global military and strategic confrontation

























two systems, and the two military blocks. It was still unclear how
events would develop in Iran, where Khomeini had come to
power. The anti-Shah revolution in Iran and the establishment of
an Islamic regime there had forced the Americans to seek new site
for military bases. Thus, mass aid to the Afghan rebels and the
increasing concentration of US forces in the region, in the imme-
diate vicinity of Soviet boarders, could not but arouse serious
alarm among the leaders of the Soviet Union. Moreover, since the
end of the 1970s, the development of the détente process in rela-
tions between the USSR and the USA had noticeably broken
down.
Under pressure from Washington, a long-term program of
armament and rearmament was initiated in Western European
countries. The Carter administration unilaterally decided to freeze,
for an indefinite period, the ratification of the SALT-2 accords. This
was interpreted in the Soviet Union as a sharp change in the gen-
eral military and political policy of the United States. NATO exam-
ined the issue of annual increases in the military budgets of its
members up to the end of the twentieth century. The Americans
created rapid intervention forces, etc. Pursuant to this, the nuclear
potential of the block was increased in an attempt by the West to
undermine strategic parity.
Such a confrontational approach spread into virtually all
areas of the relationship between the two large countries and their
allies. The Americans placed an entire series of world regions
within the sphere of Western vital interests. Naturally, the revolu-
tions of 1978 in Afghanistan—which the Soviet Union had not in
any way instigated—and later in Iran, were perceived largely in
the context of this confrontation. Attempting to compensate for a
weakened position in the Middle East, the US stationed its military-
naval forces in the Persian Gulf and developed plans for the inva-
sion of Iran. The Americans, as well as their allies, had to ask
themselves how far Afghanistan would go in its relations with the
USSR. A policy was adopted to change the regime in Kabul.
Ideas emerged on setting up American radio-electronic sur-
veillance equipment in Afghanistan to monitor the USSR, and
maybe some forms of missiles in case pro-Western forces came to
power in that country. The Soviet leadership had learned of plans
drawn up by the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies to
kindle nationalistic, pan-Islamic sentiments in the Soviet Central
Asian republics by using the territories of contiguous states. It is
easy to assume that under such circumstances the Soviet leader-
ship was most likely inclined to conclude that a fundamental
change in the situation in Afghanistan, the strengthened position
of the USA and its allies in that country, would produce, in regard
to the USSR, an overall negative shift in the balance of power, not

























boundaries. The West, undoubtedly, was hoping to stir up,
through Afghanistan, a wave of national-democratic revolutions.
This was, precisely, indicated repeatedly to representatives of
brotherly parties, who at the time considered Soviet-American
rivalry in the Third World as being natural.
Analyses show that the Soviet Union was also disturbed by the
fact that the US and China were continuing to draw closer togeth-
er on an anti-Soviet basis. In particular, the two countries had
arrived at agreements on exchanging visits at the level of cabinet
members, trade delegations and military missions; on reducing
the number of US troops on Taiwan (while maintaining the right of
the US to sell arms to Taiwan); on Chinese support for American
peace efforts in the Near East; on establishing discrete Chinese
ties with Israel; on using American influence to improve relations
between Saudi Arabia and China; on the willingness of
Washington to alter COCOM procedures so as to facilitate the
transfer of new technologies to China; on American and Chinese
aid to certain regimes in Africa, especially to those that would be
able to raise the cost of Soviet-Cuban intervention, and also on
issues such as Afghanistan, aid to Pakistan and joint efforts in
Southeast Asia to obstruct Soviet support of Vietnam.
Taking such a step, the Soviet leadership was acting on the
basis of assessments that existed at the time regarding the situa-
tion in the world and in the region, and also on the basis of views
on the prospects of rivalry with the US. The predominant opinion
was that deployment of American missiles in Europe had made
Soviet installations vulnerable, right up to the Urals, and that this
action would make it possible to reduce tensions and divert atten-
tion from European areas. The reinforcement of aircraft carrier
concentration in the Persian Gulf and of the air force on Diego
García Island, created problems for anti-aircraft defense in indus-
trial locations and the main petroleum, natural gas and coal
extraction centers in Siberia. The possibility of placing American
equipment in Afghanistan, in light of the revolution in Iran, inten-
sified the situation further. In the opinion of some experts, the dan-
ger existed that the Americans might intervene in Afghanistan,
which would produce a threat to the security of the southern bor-
ders of the USSR.
Moreover, a considerable role was likewise played by the per-
sonal factor, by the ambitions of certain Soviet politicians (H. Amin
could not be forgiven for having ignored the request to spare N.
Taraki’s life, made by the Soviet Politburo, and also in person by
Brezhnev). It was precisely the personal ambitions of the general
secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee that had a
decisive influence on the other leaders of the Soviet Union, hence
eliminating wise statesmanship and forcing a change in the previ-


























internal Afghan conflict would be futile. A certain role was played,
apparently, by the wish of Soviet leaders to prevent the establish-
ment of Amin’s terrorist regime and to protect the Afghan people
from genocide, while also not allowing the opposition to come to
power, thus preserving an ideological ally. Moreover, the style of
the leadership was, at the time, dominated by Great Power think-
ing. One could notice, at the time, a somewhat condescending
attitude towards the Afghans, and not only towards them.
However, underestimation of one’s opponent always leads to
gravely negative results.
The Soviet leadership was also greatly worried by the
prospects regarding the evolution of the regime. The personal
power of Hafizulla Amin was quickly rising in the party and in the
country. Representatives of the opposition forces in the PDPA fre-
quently turned the attention of the Soviet side to the fact that the
reckless actions of the Aminist clique were leading to the complete
physical extermination of the country’s national-patriotic and pro-
gressive forces. Reports of Amin’s collaboration with the CIA
became particularly severe.
In addition, it should be noted that in their assessment of the
situation in and around the DRA, Soviet leaders also reacted with
alarm to declarations made by Islamic fundamentalists that in the
event that they came to power they would carry the struggle under
the green flag of jihad onto the territory of the Soviet Central Asian
republics. Likewise, Soviet leaders found themselves in a situation
in which they could not refuse support to a “brotherly” party – for
this would not be understood by their allies nor by other
Communist parties. They strove to act in the interests of state secu-
rity on behalf of a higher goal: to save the “socialist” course of
development in Afghanistan.
Based on a comprehensive analysis of the complex measures
taken during this time by the Americans, not only in Afghanistan
(in particular, the Strategic Defense Initiative and the “swing” in
the American arms race), it may be said that Soviet intelligence
“swallowed the bait”; they were intentionally led into deception by
the excellent use of extensive misinformation on a strategic scale.
While amassing troops for deployment in Afghanistan, the military
command vainly nurtured illusions that it could achieve the ele-
ment of surprise and secrecy. Perhaps some details even could be
kept secret, but this was hardly that important. The main point is
that the Soviets found ourselves in a trap from which they extract-
ed themselves only after great efforts and losses. Not having any
idea about the misinformation, Soviet leaders pursued the arms
race beyond all permissible levels, by which they undermined the
economy of the country and brought the subsistence of the popu-
lation to poverty. The same can be said for the deployment of

























the “Cold War” in which the American strategists strove to achieve
political goals without direct armed force, but rather through the
application of other forms of coercion, undermining the power
and military organization of the USSR from within, which brought
victory without a fight and bloodshed.
The Soviet Union underestimated the influence of the interna-
tional factor. It was assumed that Washington would not react too
keenly to such an operation. Well, isn’t Afghanistan a purely
Soviet patrimony? This would not seriously effect its relations with
the US. After all, while the Vietnam War was going on, for exam-
ple, the Soviets continued to cooperate with the Americans.
However, objectively it was favorable for the United States to
have the Soviet Union tied up in regional conflict for an extended
time. The US received with satisfaction the information that Soviet
troops had been sent to Afghanistan, and it protracted their stay
in the country as long as possible. The goal was to exhaust the
Soviet Union economically and morally, to force it to carry the
back-breaking burden of a drawn-out war.
In my view, there was no overriding need to send troops to the
DRA. No objective circumstances, even then, necessitated it. The
subjective, “personal” factor was decisive. And we went there to
secure peace, but what did we bring was war. It is extremely
important to consider this fact today, when making decisions on
conducting peace operations under the aegis of the UN. After all,
the deployment in combat zones even of multinational peace-
keeping troops will often play the role of detonator, provoking an
escalation of the conflict and showing itself to be scarcely effec-
tive.
The officially proclaimed primary goal of the Soviet presence
in the DRA was peace-making. This was formulated unequivocal-
ly: providing assistance to stabilize the situation, repelling possible
aggression from abroad. The Soviet troops had to take up garri-
son duty and not be involved in internal conflict and combat oper-
ations. They were ordered to offer aid to the local population
everywhere, to protect it from gangs, and also to distribute food-
stuffs, fuel, and other necessities. It was predicted that the very
presence of Soviet troops would become a strong stabilizing fac-
tor, that it would significantly reinforce the PDPA regime, that it
would have a restraining effect on opposition movements…
Today, of course, it is widely known that such arrangements were
unrealistic, but at the time it was considered acceptable. In reali-
ty, the troops were expected to secure Hafizulla Amin’s removal
from power and support the establishment of Babrak Karmal’s
regime. According to estimates, the Soviet troops should have
been withdrawn from Afghanistan in three to four months. If that
had happened, possibly there would not have been such severe

























turns out differently. The troops stayed in the country for over ten
years.
The Deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
The deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan brought about
an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict. The Soviet mili-
tary presence was associated with the spread of institutions, for-
eign to the national peculiarities and feelings of the Afghan peo-
ple, which did not respect the multi-structured economy and other
specificities: tribal, regional. The military and political situation,
contrary to expectations and hopes, did not improve, but rather
deteriorated significantly.
The arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their later
involvement in the war on the side of the Kabul regime brought
about an abrupt international reaction, especially from the US, the
NATO countries, the countries of the Islamic world, China… They
saw it as a direct attempt by Moscow to disrupt—to its own advan-
tage—the strategic balance of power that had taken shape until
then on the global and regional level. In their opinion, owing to
further instability in Iran, there was no longer any other barrier in
Southwest Asia to a Soviet breakthrough to the Indian Ocean. The
arising imbalance was quickly eliminated by the amassing of arms
and supplies for the Afghan opposition in Pakistan, and by rein-
forcing Western military presence in strategically important zones
in the region.
Among Western states, the US was the most negative in its
reactions to events in Afghanistan. Disturbed by the acute crisis in
American-Iranian relations, by the possibility of socio-political
shifts in the oil producing nations of the Near and Middle East, the
administration concluded that events in Afghanistan destabilized
US influence in the region even more, at a time critical to its inter-
ests. Recognizing that it was impossible to directly intervene in the
affairs of the DRA with the aim of aiding the Afghan opposition,
the US placed high hopes in the use of Pakistan, the People’s
Republic of China, certain Islamic countries, and also its allies in
NATO.
The American government reached a decision to urgently
send arms and technical supplies to Pakistan, up to the sum of
100 million dollars. The USA conducted consultations with the
leaders of Pakistan and China, and likewise within the framework
of NATO.
Pakistan, which on the eve of the “Afghan War” had been fac-
ing the threat of economic and political bankruptcy, was trans-
formed into a “front-line state” and started to receive extensive
military and economic aid from the US and Saudi Arabia. The
United States took an unprecedented step – supplying such aid in
circumvention of American legislation that prohibited giving it to194
countries that were developing nuclear arms. The regime of Zia-
ul-Haq also succeeded in establishing direct contacts with the
leaders of Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Japan, having reinforced its role in the Islamic
world and consolidated its ties with China in the business of devel-
oping nuclear weapons. In connection with this, one may recall
the actions of the US in the analogous problem regarding Iran
and Iraq.
Pakistan expressed a strong negative reaction to events in
Afghanistan, deducing that the Soviet army would soon essential-
ly be present on the Pakistani border. Among Arab states, the most
negative response to the arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
was that of Egypt. The move of the USSR was condemned by
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates…
Yet in leftist Arab circles, the Soviet Union’s actions were received
with satisfaction.
The actions of the Soviet Union provoked a negative reaction
in Beijing. Chinese leaders accused the Soviet Union of trying to
establish full control over Afghanistan and expressed their readi-
ness to support any American activity in connection with events in
the DRA.
After making officially a negative statement on Afghanistan,
the political and religious leaders of Iran assumed a relatively
quiet stance, which was explained by the extreme tensions in
Iranian-American relations, by Khomeini’s desire to improve rela-
tions with the USSR, and by Iran’s interest in the Soviet “veto” dur-
ing the debate on sanctions against Iran in the UN Security
Council.
The further development of events showed the Afghan theme
interested the US and its allies in as much as it enabled following
a course of increased confrontation with the USSR. Applying var-
ious methods of pressure, the Americans strove to exploit the sit-
uation that had arisen here as one of the factors in their external
policy, after having launched an extensive campaign to discredit
the USSR.
When Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan, the United
States, their allies, certain Arabic and Islamic regimes, as well as
China, openly announced their support and aid to the opposition.
This aid was shown even before, but now it significantly increased.
Afghanistan found itself isolated on the international level and
found support only in the socialist camp, mainly in the Soviet
Union.
The United States launched a propaganda campaign aimed
at demonstrating to the leaders and people of the Islamic states
that the USSR, and not the US, was the “mortal enemy of Islam.”
Thus, the US strove to undercut the Soviet Union’s position in the

























sure on American NATO allies and Japan to obtain international
condemnation of the Soviet Union for its role in Afghan events.
During the session of the Security Council on Afghan issue on
January 14, 1980, most member states of the UN General
Assembly condemned the USSR’s actions, calling for immediate
withdrawal of Soviet units from the DRA (104 countries voted
“for,” 48 were “opposed” or “abstained”). The actions of the
Soviet Union were also condemned by countries of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) and of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as
by some socialist countries.
Listed concisely, the measures taken by US government took
against the USSR, after comprehensive deliberation and consulta-
tions with its allies, included the following: pushing demands in
the UN Security Council for a condemnation the USSR for open,
unprovoked aggression against an independent state; ending
deliberation in Congress on the SALT-2 accords until the aggres-
sion stopped; a temporary freeze of all bilateral negotiations, top-
level visits, transfers of advanced technology and, possibly, impos-
ing a ban on the sale of grain; limiting loans for the USSR from
the US and its European allies; refusal to diplomatically recognize
the new government in Afghanistan by the USA and, consequent-
ly, by the NATO member states;  providing periodic aid to Pakistan
in order to reinforce its defense potential; reaching an under-
standing with the governments of Egypt and Somalia for the use,
by the Americans, of military bases on their territories in the event
of a military threat to the Middle East or the Persian Gulf region;
adopting a covert program to provide Muslim insurgents in
Afghanistan with anti-tank and anti-aircraft projectiles of Soviet
make, possibly from Egypt; encouraging China to provide aid to
the insurgents in the form of machine-guns, mortars, anti-person-
nel and anti-tank mines; and boycotting the Olympic Games in
Moscow.
By sending troops to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union crossed
the permissible limits of confrontation in the “Third World.” The
benefits of this action showed themselves insignificant in compar-
ison with the damage that was inflicted to the country’s interests:
in addition to two fronts of opposition—in Europe against NATO
and in East Asia again China—a third dangerous hotbed of mili-
tary and political tension arose along the southern flank of the
USSR, in unfavorable geographic and socio-political conditions;
the anti-Soviet bloc surrounding the USSR from the West to the
East, was significantly extended and consolidated; the influence of
the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, especially on the
Islamic world, significantly suffered; détente was blocked and the
political preconditions for limiting the arms race were eliminated;
economic and technological pressure on the USSR rose sharply.

























however, after deploying troops on Afghan territory, instead of a
friend it made an enemy.
The United States did everything it could to make the Soviet
Union pay a high price for its involvement in Afghanistan, choos-
ing Afghanistan as a polygon for decisive counteraction against
“Soviet expansion.” Defeat of the latter had to bring about not
only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country and the
downfall of the “pro-Communist Kabul regime,” but also destabi-
lization of the situation in the USSR itself.
A plan developed by the CIA in collaboration with the secret
service of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, code-named “Program-M,”
counted on extensive use of the Islamic factor and, above all, of
the armed Islamic opposition in Afghanistan. It foresaw a coordi-
nated operation by all mujahidin units, providing arms to them,
organizing the training of combatants in special centers, and the
creation of a spy network in the DRA and in the southern parts of
the USSR. Realization of the intended measures also entailed the
engagement of participation of various Islamic centers operating
in Islamic states, including organizations with a fundamentalist
character.
In providing military aid to the Afghan democratic forces, the
Soviet leaders, contrary to the view of military experts, had over-
estimated the effect that the very deployment of troops to the DRA
might have. Also, they had not sufficiently studied the fact that,
due to centuries of war with different subjugators, a firmly
ingrained view had formed in the awareness of each Afghan, by
which foreign troops entering the country, even with good inten-
tions, are always foreign occupiers with whom one must do bat-
tle.
With the arrival of Soviet troops in the DRA, the main unifying
ideological and political catchword of the anti-government forces
became the call to holy war, “jihad.” One should admit that this
call of the Mullahs was understood by a large part of the Afghan
population, fed by centuries of Muslim tradition and also the
action of the Islamic authorities.
It is no secret that for many years the Soviet Union’s policy of
foreign security had been built to a great degree on ideological
dogmas. These, precisely, became the criteria for judging the
validity of the decisions made at the time. The state and national
interests of the country were subordinated to them. Particular
attention was given to supporting ideological allies.
Conducting combat operations
Finding themselves in Afghanistan, the Soviet troops conduct-
ed mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very limited
forces and equipment. In all of the years of the war, there was not

























Contingent) simultaneously and in all areas conducted active
combat operations against the rebels. Military operations were
limited to the following:
– combat with the most dangerous opposition units;
– destruction or capture of their base areas, together with their
reserves of arms, materials and technical supplies;
– control of the main strategic communications with the aim of
securing stable administrative and economic ties between the
center and periphery; 
– escorting convoys with material supplies – both for the LSTC
and for the Afghan government;
– rendering aide to government troops in blocking the Afghan-
Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian borders, with the aim of pre-
venting the arrival of manpower in Afghanistan for the oppo-
sition units and the passage of caravans bringing them sup-
plies;
– providing support to Afghan troops during operations against
armed opposition formations.
However, with the composition of forces and equipment at the
disposal of the Soviet troops in the DRA, it was impossible to fully
solve the entire complex of military tasks with the necessary effec-
tiveness. Yet even taking this into account, the mujahidin could not
stand up to regular troops in open combat. They suffered defeats.
But these defeats did not cost them as much as victories cost its
troops.
They faced difficult specific problems when operating in high
altitude conditions, with low and high air temperatures, green
zones and desert areas, with a complex epidemiological situa-
tion... The personnel turned out to be poorly prepared for combat
in the conditions of Afghanistan. Here everything happened dif-
ferently than predicted in tactical textbooks and military manuals,
different from the way in which the troops had been instructed.
Likewise, the Soviet army had not participated in actual combat
operations for a long time. This why the war became a war of con-
tinuous “surprises.”
Soviet regular military units, sub-units, and individual service-
men turned out to be insufficiently trained for the operational tac-
tics of the small mobile armed groups of the opposition. Until the
middle of 1980, they conducted actions in a traditional manner,
conducting raids mainly along roads and in valleys, where it was
possible to apply military technology; these proved highly ineffec-
tive, not producing results. There were also problems with the con-
trol of operations: if bits of information on the situation and the
troops came to government troops, they would immediately fall



























It was necessary to seek out totally different forms and meth-
ods of conducting combat operations, different from those that
had been described in military manuals. Consequently, opera-
tional tactics were continuously re-evaluated, corrected, brought
into line with local conditions.
In Afghanistan, the 40th Army, fighting armed opposition units,
operated, as a rule, with success – although it had to suffer great
burdens and hardships, since it had to fight in very complex cli-
matic conditions. Mountain and desert areas, high and low tem-
peratures, sudden downpours, low oxygen levels, the absence of
water, infectious diseases – all this contributed to make addition-
al difficulties. Yet throughout the “Afghan War,” not a single sub-
unit of Soviet troops either retreated or surrendered its position.
However, partial successes did not lead to reducing tensions, and
the scale of the rebel movement expanded. After all, the main
causes lay not in the military, but in the political sphere.
The opposition quickly restored its forces. It created new
armed units from among refugees in Pakistan and from the local
population. It also did not experience a shortage of arms. The
main principles by which these armed units conducted operations
were: avoiding direct clashes with the superior forces of regular
troops; not transforming operations into positional warfare, for-
saking possession of occupied territories for a long time; attack-
ing suddenly, extensively using guerrilla tactics, and also terrorism,
blackmail and the ideological preparation of government soldiers
and the population. The level of sophistication of their equipment
and arms, especially small-scale arms, and likewise the use of ter-
rorist fighting methods, enabled the armed units of the opposition
to solve strategic tasks in the civil war with the use of small forces.
As the war in Afghanistan showed, against terrorists it is essen-
tial to apply forestalling measures, utilizing sub-units specially
trained for these purposes and applying special fighting tactics.
Negotiations with terrorists are, as a rule, largely ineffective and
encourage them in the further implementation of terror. In local
wars, a professional army must be used, well trained and with bat-
tle experience.
The intensity of the internal crisis in Afghanistan continued to
grow, and the Soviet military presence was associated with the
expansion of institutions, foreign to the national character and
feelings of the Afghan people, not in tune with the multi-structured
economy and other specific features, such as tribal and religious
factors.
Every year the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated further.
The extent of the territory over which the PDPA held sway persist-
ently grew smaller. Declarations by the government that it con-


























One line of action was clearly visible among the leaders of
the DRA: fight the mujahidin on the whole with military means. In
this they counted to a great degree on the Soviet army. But mere
military measures could not attain the desired result. Unless the
opposition was deprived of its social basis, of the possibility of
reinforcing itself with local and external resources, it would be
impossible to achieve a fundamental improvement of the situation
in the country in a short time. However, this is precisely what the
Afghan leadership did not want to comprehend, or perhaps such
a position suited it.
In the USSR, many leaders began to understand that it could
no longer continue this way. To them, and not just to military lead-
ers, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the internal
Afghan problem could not be solved through by military means.
Such a course was leading to a dead-end. Not immediately, but
still, a conviction developed: new approaches are needed, addi-
tional steps in the development of a strategy capable of extin-
guishing the fire of this fratricidal war.
Yet some forces remained, primarily the US, to whom it was
advantageous that the Soviet Union remain in this war as long as
possible, suffering political and economic losses. The Americans
not only prolonged negotiations on an Afghan settlement and
provided aid and support to the armed units of the opposition,
they also did everything to make the USSR pay the highest possi-
ble price for its military involvement in Afghanistan. The director
of the CIA at the time, William Casey, conducted an active oper-
ation meant to undermine the Soviet Union. In October 1984,
Casey made a secret trip to Islamabad. He suggested, and the
Pakistanis agreed, to extend destabilizing propaganda activity
through Afghanistan to the southern Soviet republics with their
predominately Muslim populations. Management of this illicit
activity was conducted by Pakistan’s Interdepartmental Intelligence
Directorate. There were also suggestions to conduct raids into
Soviet territory, but fearing an adequate response from the Soviet
side and an unfavorable effect of such an operations on Soviet-
American relations, the Reagan administration did not decide to
initiate an extensive underground war on the territory of the USSR
at the time.
In March 1985 president Reagan signed national security res-
olution No. 166, which provided for increased clandestine mili-
tary aide to the mujahidin and clarified the new goal of the secret
Afghan war: the defeat of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by means
of covert operations and a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
At the same time the Reagan administration, due to strategic
considerations, torpedoed negotiations on an Afghan settlement
that were being conducted under the aegis of the UN. In particu-

























Geneva, President Reagan decided to increase the amount of
clandestine aid to the rebels. In December 1982, after the meet-
ing between Yuri V. Andropov and Zia-ul-Haq, during which the
latter was told that the USSR would leave Afghanistan “quickly” if
Pakistan would stop its support to the resistance, Reagan gave
instructions to the CIA to deliver more, and higher quality, arms to
the mujahidin. Then when Diego Cordoves, in May 1983,
declared that “95 percent of the text of the preliminary compre-
hensive resolution is already complete,” the US government pub-
lished information that it had shared with Saudi Arabia expenses
of up to 50 million dollars on arms for the rebels. The negotia-
tions immediately became more complicated. In March 1986,
Cordoves declared that all elements were present for a compre-
hensive solution to the Afghan problem. And the Reagan admin-
istration began supplying the Afghan rebels with “Stinger” anti-
aircraft missiles.
The passive, basically spur-of-the-moment and retaliatory mil-
itary actions, relatively limited in scale, that the Soviet troops had
carried out in Afghanistan, i.e. along the lines developed by the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled low-intensity conflict, could not
bring about defeat of the enemy, but at the same time it did wear
down the Soviet Union, either economically and morally.
In connection with the participation of Soviet troops in the
internal conflict in Afghanistan, the international prestige of the
country began to fall: even in the eyes of its allies. The arguments
offered by Soviet leaders on the righteousness of the Soviet mili-
tary presence in the DRA were not satisfying. It was condemned in
various forums, including in those conducted under the aegis of
the UN, and with an overwhelming majority of the votes. The neg-
ative effects of this war started to make themselves felt within the
Soviet Union. The death of Soviet boys in a foreign land aroused
consternation not only in their families, but also in all decent peo-
ple. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership finally decided that it
was essential to bring matters toward a withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan.
The national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan
In 1986 there was a change in the leadership of Afghanistan.
The post of general secretary of the PDPA, and later also of pres-
ident of Afghanistan, went to a new figure: Najibullah, a man will-
ing to seek out solutions to the problems and who understood the
expectations of his countrymen. He began to implement a com-
pletely new policy, calling for an end to the war – a policy of
national reconciliation. The Afghan leadership developed its
efforts to consolidate the armed forces and the local administra-

























also set to work on resolving socio-economic problems, turning to
the real needs of the entire population. In accordance with this,
the position of government rule began to strengthen. One has to
give credit to Najibullah and his colleagues: they showed out-
standing courage, resolve and consistency, proposing and imple-
menting a policy leading to the cessation of military conflicts,
wherever this was possible.
The opposition, however, aware of the strategic orientation of
Soviet leadership to pull its troops out of Afghanistan, and calcu-
lating that without the direct assistance of Soviet troops
Najibullah’s regime would not know how to protect its position,
continued the course towards destroying him by armed means. It
became clear that the opposition would not settle for sharing
power today, if it could seize all of it tomorrow.
On April 14, 1988, with UN mediation in Geneva, the for-
eign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a package of
documents, calling for an end to the bloodshed in the RA. The US
and the USSR stepped forward as guarantors assuring fulfillment
of the agreements. The most essential aspect of the agreements,
as it seems, was that in principle they provided the possibility of
solving the main issue in the Afghan situation: halting armed and
other interference in Afghanistan affairs from abroad.
In a bilateral agreement on the principles of mutual relations,
the following was specified: Afghanistan and Pakistan accept the
commitment that their territories must not be used in any way to
violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity
and national unity of either side, or to destabilize the other side’s
political, economic and social stability; they pledge to abstain
from assisting, encouraging and supporting, directly or indirectly,
insurgent or separatist action, aimed at undermining the unity, or
overthrowing the political order of the other side; they must not
permit equipping, funding or recruitment of mercenaries in their
territories for the purpose of hostile operations against the territo-
ry of the other side and, consequently, they deny assistance,
including funds for training, supplying and transit to such merce-
naries; they will not permit any aid to, use or tolerance of terror-
ist groups, saboteurs or subversives; they oblige themselves not to
permit the presence or sheltering of camps and bases on their ter-
ritories, as well as organizations for training, funding, supplying or
arming persons or groups for the purpose of carrying out diver-
sionary operations, creating disorder, disturbances, utilizing the
mass media, or transporting arms, ammunition and equipment.
The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
the voluntary return of refugees obliged both sides to take the nec-
essary measures for resolving the problem.
In accordance with these understandings, the USSR commit-

























month period, starting from May 15, 1988. In the course of the
first three months of the year, half of all Soviet troops were with-
drawn.
Pakistan and the US had to stop all interference in the inter-
nal affairs of Afghanistan.
On the basis of these agreements, the Soviet Union pulled its
troops out of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, realized in exactly the period specified by the
Geneva understanding (starting on May 15, 1988 and ending on
February 15, 1989), was conducted in an organized manner and
with minimal losses. At this time, the Soviets experienced virtually
no problems. The mujahidin did not hinder the withdrawal of the
troops and did not use any force against them.
The Civil War without Soviet troops
After Soviet troops departed from Afghanistan, not much
changed in the country. The scale of the fighting between the
Afghans themselves even increased. More and more people per-
ished. It became clear that the cause was not, or maybe not so
much, the presence of the Soviet troops in the RA! For they left
Afghan territory and the war intensified! Apparently, the bloodshed
benefited those who had profited greatly from the war, who con-
tinued to receive large dividends. Likewise, an entire generation of
Afghans had come of age to whom participation in the war
became a highly lucrative profession.
Having survived for three years after the end of military assis-
tance and support from the USSR, the Najibullah regime never-
theless fell in April 1992. It would seem that now the war had
come to an end, all mujahidin leaders proclaimed unanimously
that they would establish peace and tranquility. But the war flared
up with new vigor between the mujahidin themselves—former
partners and rivals in the opposition party groups. The mujahidin
leaders were utterly unable to share power. The country found
itself divided into zones, where this or that mujahidin group would
manage affairs. The political and territory integrity of Afghanistan
was virtually shattered.
In this context, the Tajiks (B. Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud)
had established their authority in Kabul and opposition between
the Pashtu and members of ethnic minorities increased. A new
force stepped onto the political scene in the form of the Taliban
Islamic Movement, which was also fighting for power. In a brief
time, the Taliban were able to take control of the greater part of
Afghanistan, and here they established their institutions.
The Taliban had stepped forward with the slogan to “clean”
the country of violence, murder, and lawlessness, but instead of
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the promised relief, they threw millions of Afghans into conditions
of great severity, the likes of which had never been seen in the
past. In the zones under their influence, they set up Sheri’at laws.
Thieves would have their fingers or hands cut off. Everywhere they
destroyed television sets and video recorders (“boxes of the
devil”). They issued orders forbidding the education of girls and
the employment of women outside of the home, which placed
many widows on the verge of death by hunger. Women were for-
bidden to appear in the streets without male escort. They had to
wear traditional Muslim dress that covered them from head to
foot…
The initial favorable impression of the Taliban rapidly turned
into disillusionment. The regime they established – a mix of
archaism and intolerance – was unacceptable for Afghanistan.
Through the ostentatious Islamic fundamentalism one could
detect a striving to restore the dominant position of the Pashtu.
Today, the country is virtually divided into several autonomous
areas or zones, controlled by diverse groupings (the Taliban,
Masud, Dustom, Khalil, Naderi etc.). The war in Afghanistan has
continued to the present, and there is no end in sight.
What will happen in the future? Most likely a prolongation of
the conflict awaits Afghanistan, but, plausibly, if the war stops, it
seems the final result could look like this: a traditionally weak cen-
tral government as well as powerful provincial (peripheral) rulers
(field commanders, most likely, that had replaced traditional trib-
al chiefs in the provinces and with control over given zones), inter-
acting with one another on the horizontal level and making con-
cluding agreements… In order to remain in power in the
provinces, they would naturally defend their positions from any
central government – whatever it was. It is clear that the unity of
the country can be preserved only if some inter-ethnic compro-
mise can be achieved. And it is unlikely that a leading position in
the Afghan state could be taken by members of non-Pashtu ethnic
groups, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Pashtu will maintain a
dominant influence in the structures of power. A relative intereth-
nic balance might be restored, with some predominance of the
Pashtu people.
Since it is not likely that the Pashtu will be able, as before, to
dictate their conditions to ethnic minorities, and the latter also will
not give up their gains, there is also the likelihood that several
autonomous zones or states will be formed in Afghan territory
according to ethnic affiliations (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazarians). In this,
however, much depends on whether the present leaders of the eth-
nic minorities will know how to arrive at agreements among them-
selves, for their coalition is extremely unstable and its basis is anti-
Pashtuism. This is a very shaky foundation. If it collapses, then the

























entire territory of Afghanistan. Yet the war will not end with this.
Armed units from among the ethnic minorities will prolong it
through guerrilla methods.
The possibility should also not be excluded that a confedera-
tion of states or some other type of compromise, with considera-
tion for the balance of forces created in the region, might emerge
in the territory of Afghanistan. It is wholly possible that new states
on an ethnic basis will form in Afghan territory and, partially, in
Pakistan and Iran – for example, Pushtunistan, Khazarajata,
Baluchistan. Although this process is very long, much depends on
what sort of interests will be pursued by influential foreign powers:
first of all by the USA, Western Europe, and the Islamic states.
Apparently the Afghans themselves cannot stop the war and,
in all likelihood, international mechanisms will have to be intro-
duced to force the warring groups to make peace. However, pri-
ority must be give to political methods of settlement, with the par-
ticipation of all interested sides.
Some summations and conclusions
– The experiment involving forced reconstruction of society in
Afghanistan ended in failure. This cost the country great loss-
es: thousands of villages (kishlaks) and irrigation systems were
ruined; enormous areas of fertile land and gardens were
destroyed; millions of peaceful inhabitants became refugees,
homeless persons, many died (according to some estimates
1–2.5 million people) or were disabled. Afghan society was
hurled far behind in its development.
– The consequences of the Afghan conflict for the Soviet Union
turned out to be most severe. It facilitated the defeat of the
USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation between
the two super-powers, socio-political systems, and military
blocs. The Afghan ordeal worsened the political, economic,
and ethnic crisis points what began to be visible in the Soviet
Union country in the 1970s. Afghanistan did not allow Soviet
involvement in looking for a way out of the crisis and in many
ways it contributed to the disintegration of the USSR and its
army.
Above all, the Soviet Union suffered great material and moral
loses. One million men passed through Afghanistan. The
dead numbered 14,626, not including those that died in cap-
tivity or that are considered missing in action. About 50,000
men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, over 500,000
contracted various severe illnesses – there were tens of thou-
sands of shattered lives, hundreds of thousands in need of
psychiatric rehabilitation. In addition, 147 tanks were lost,
1,312 armored vehicles, 233 artillery guns and mortars, 114

























– There is never a winner in civil war; there is only a draw. And in
fact, the very war, as a rule, continues until a point when a
balance of power is established. It is impossible to resolve
political problems through military methods. In the ideal
sense, a civil war should end through consensus in society.
Such a consensus has not been achieved in Afghanistan to
this time, and therefore the war continues.
– The civil war in Afghanistan is above all the result of global rival-
ries between the super-power states and conflicting political
systems. Had there not been interference from abroad, it
would not have had such an extensive, harsh, and total char-
acter. Obviously, the war would have had a much lesser dura-
tion.
– In Afghanistan, the Soviets faced conflict-ridden confrontations
between several civilizations and cultures. Looking at Afghan
society, its socio-economic structure is patriarchal, its spiritu-
al-religious aspect is traditional, built upon a system of tribal
and gentile relations – elders and religious communities. The
Islam that lies at the heart of the religiousness of many
Afghans is not classical, but rather everyday Islam, to some
extent half-pagan. And the Afghans could not comprehend
very many things that the members of the PDPA tried to pro-
claim and put into practice with Soviet help. From the stand-
point of European civilization, many of the processes going
on in Afghanistan are logically inexplicable and, thus, the rec-
ommendations that were elaborated frequently had an
abstract nature and could not be put into practice. A type of
democratic regime existed in that country for centuries, which
had enabled the nation to preserve itself. The people took in
with their mother’s milk a spirit of freedom and did not wish
relinquish it. The East has its own ways, its own sacred things,
to everything its value…
– The goals that the leaders of the DRA set for themselves were,
in themselves, to a certain degree progressive, since the result
of the projected transformations was conceived of as an
improvement in the lives of the Afghans. However, there did
not exist any objective conditions, neither a social nor eco-
nomic basis, nor mass support, for the proclaimed slogans
and for the political decisions to bring about radical socialist
transformations. The replacing of old institutions with new
ones is a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Thus, before
initiating changes it is essential to take into account the active
opposition of those forces that are content with the old insti-
tutions and the inertia of those who like the new ones, for usu-
ally people do not believe in what is new until it is made cer-
tain through lengthy experiment. Adherents of the old institu-

























of the new institutions, as a rule, act sluggishly. The nature of
people is not constant, and if it is easy to convert them to
one’s faith, to hold them to it is difficult. If there are no posi-
tive changes, then the people’s faith rapidly dries up. The
attempt to introduce the Afghan people to a new ideology
(civilization) through force ended in complete failure.
– The political actions of the leaders of the PDPA, especially in
carrying out water and land reforms, were effected through
voluntaristic and coercive means, without regard for the real-
ities accumulated in the country and the interests of broad
sections of the populace, with devastation of natural regular-
ities and destruction of age-old systems of management and
local self-government. The PDPA regime could not resolve
social problems and secure a better life for the broad masses
of the population – the peasants, and without their support,
the government could not hold out.
– The leadership of Afghanistan did not follow imperative proce-
dures, which might have enabled the party to maintain its rule
over the country. For the sake of avoiding civil war, first of all
it would have been necessary to achieve unity among the
leaders of the party and of the DRA government, and also to
devise a flexible internal policy, based on traditional forms
and methods of management that would have helped secure
implementation of vital gradual changes in the key spheres of
the economy and of the political super-structure, helped
attract a greater part of the country’s population to the side of
the PDPA and, thus, reduce the social base for the opposition.
– The decision of the Soviet leadership to deploy troops in the
DRA was made without proper analyses of the situation and
predictions on the development of the state of affairs, without
appraisals of the causes, character, dimensions, and forms of
the conflict, and also without a clear statement of the gener-
al political and strategic aims. The Soviet leadership suc-
cumbed to an obvious over-estimation of its own strength and
to an under-estimation of the Afghan ability to oppose them,
of the general situation in the region and especially of the
external factor. Analyses of US actions before the entry of
Soviet troops in Afghanistan gives reason to believe that the
leaders of the Soviet Union became “victims” of strategic mis-
information, skillfully put into effect by American intelligence
agencies. Deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was
very advantageous to the United States, since it enabled the
latter to solve many problems, both in the region and in rela-
tions with the USSR. An attempt to solve an equation from
higher mathematics with the help of arithmetic led to the con-
clusion that Afghanistan became a “quagmire” for the Soviet

























ers had a hazy notion on the strategy and the end result of
troop deployment.
– Intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan by a third force (Soviet
troops) brought with it escalation and polarization of the
opposing sides; it was conducive to drawing formerly neutral
forces into the fight against “marionette figures”, and also
brought about internationalization of the internal Afghan con-
flict. In late 1979 there was no overriding need to send Soviet
troops to the DRA. No objective circumstances necessitated it.
The decisive element turned out to be the subjective, “per-
sonal” factor. The troops entered Afghanistan officially with
peace-making goals – to secure the territorial integrity of that
country and to support peace – yet they brought war. It is very
important to consider this fact when making decisions on
implementing peace-making operations and activities aimed
at forcing conflicting parties to make peace, including those
under the aegis of the UN and NATO. After all, the entry into
combat zones even of multinational peace-making troops
often plays the role of a detonator, provoking escalation of the
conflict, and proving ineffective if they do not have sufficient
strength and do not undertake decisive action.
– It is essential to strive, using all possible means, to avert the out-
break of war, to look for a peaceful solution to this or that
conflict. It is necessary to seek out any compromise and make
maximum permissible concessions, to preserve peace. Before
deciding on war, all other solutions must be attempted.
Recourse to war should be taken only when there are no
longer any other options. Lawlessness, however, should not be
tolerated as a way to prevent war, for then one cannot avoid
war and loses the advantage. And if a decision to initiate
combat operations is already taken, then one must not enter-
tain illusions that all will pass with minimal sacrifices. History
has shown more than once that one cannot play at war, and
if it is commenced, it must be fought properly. As the great
Chinese military leader Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) said: “War is a great
affair for a state, it is the foundation of life and death, the way
of survival or downfall.”2
– The tasks the political leadership of the USSR set were set down
in detail, but the forces provided to accomplish them were
insufficient. A relatively small number of troops, an extremely
short time for planning operations, inadequate training of
men and officers for anti-guerrilla warfare, all this and more
prevented the Soviet Union from realizing its set goals. Hence,
the conclusion – a politician makes an error worthy of con-
demnation when he does not consider his options and strives


























Modern small caliber arms make it possible to effectively con-
duct combat operations against a regular army even with
armed formations that are significantly inferior to it in total
military potential. Hence, it is necessary to create a powerful
troop concentration, capable of securing real control over the
entire territory of the hypothetical opponent and destroy its
fighting units in a short period. Moreover, such troops must be
trained in advance and with consideration of the specific
aspects of the military operation. Prior to commencing oper-
ations it is necessary to complete thorough reconnaissance
and assessment of the opponent’s fighting potential, make
forestalling concentrated bombings and artillery strikes
against his most important installations, paralyze his control
over armed units, and also put into effect a wide-range intel-
ligence operations, as well as sabotage and special meas-
ures. Only afterwards can troops be introduced, preferably
from different directions, and immediately in all the key
regions of the country, in effect to establish their control in
them. From the very beginning, it is necessary to conduct
active combat operations, not permitting the opponent to
recuperate and organize, until his full defeat or surrender. It is
also necessary to take measures to cut all supply routes of
arms and ammunition to the enemy.
– In a local war troops must act decisively and quickly. After inflict-
ing maximum losses on the enemy and fulfilling political
goals, they must withdraw from the country as soon as possi-
ble, leaving resolution of issues regarding the establishment
of authority to the political bodies of allies. A prolonged war
is a disaster for a state. If there is not a quick victory, then a
long war is worse than defeat. As even the ancients said: “If a
war drags out, it is unfavorable. War is like a flame: if you do
not blow it out on time, you yourself will burn in it” (Cao
Gong).3
It is essential even in peacetime to maintain a certain number
of divisions and brigades in constant combat readiness, fully
manned and trained for conducting anti-guerrilla warfare in
diverse climatic conditions.
– Against armed units acting with guerrilla methods one needs to
apply non-traditional tactics and strategies for conducting
combat operations. In this case, generally accepted methods
of waging war should be applied only exceptionally.
Traditional tactics for carrying out military actions in regions
with local conflicts, as shown by experience, frequently turn
out unfavorable. Here there is no solid front-line. Guerrilla
units evade direct clashes; they inflict sudden strikes against
individual installations, small garrisons and obstruct commu-

























subversive activities. In combat operations a maneuverable
quality prevails, in combination with tough positional defense
on the level of platoons, companies and more rarely battal-
ions. Therefore, the types and methods of combat operations,
developed by Soviet troops in the course of the war in
Afghanistan, should be applied.
The most effect method of combat operations in these condi-
tions was encirclement of the enemy and cutting off escape
routes, with successive destruction or capture.
The success of combat operations depends on a well-organ-
ized system of intelligence, extensive use of commandos and
airborne assault actions, effective use of diverse types of
maneuvers (side-sweeps, outflanking and their variations), in
combination with air and high-precision gunnery strikes.
When annihilating the enemy in fortified strongholds, to
achieve the set goals with the least loses, it is essential to
block in the defenders in due time, seize and hold command-
ing heights, effectively hit exposed weaponry with air strikes,
artillery, tank fire and other firing means, and simultaneously
attack from all sides with the engagement of the maximum
number of troops.
In order to route small mobile irregular armed detachments of
combatants in a (local) civil war, especially in mountains and
forests, one must engage a much larger number of troops
and equipment than is needed in conducting traditional com-
bat operations against a regular army, since insurgents avoid
direct battle clashes; they are dispersed over a large area and
they make use of guerrilla forms and methods of fighting.
In order to control territory, it is necessary to create a complex
security system, containing well fortified troop garrisons, a
network of pickets and outposts, regime-controlled zones
around airports and vitally important installations, maneuver-
able on-duty sub-units, continuous watch by reconnaissance
and strike aircraft over the land and sky, and on-duty assault
landing or mobile airborne sub-units. For the purpose of
excluding attacks on equipment convoys, blockade-posts
(pickets) must be set up along transport routes near places
convenient for making ambushes, and when the convoys pass
through gorges commanding heights must be held. But the
blockade-posts must be strong and well fortified, or else they
will become targets of attack for the fighters. Each convoy
must have direct protection, for which special road-comman-
deer units must be created. A major role is played by an effi-
cient and effective system for receiving intelligence on the
enemy near the convoys travel routes, and also by engineer-


























– It is impossible to definitely defeat the opponent as long as it
receives reinforcements from fighter training camps and there
is an uninterrupted supply of military equipment, arms and
ammunition for his units. It is essential to take maximum fea-
sible measures to securely close the channels through which
aid arrives from allies. In Afghanistan, the opposition received
military aid through the entire duration of the war. The efforts
of the Soviet military command to restrain it turned out futile.
– Without creating the proper conditions and eliminating the
causes that had given rise to the war, appeals and slogans of
peace will never stop it. In order to achieve national concilia-
tion, there must be a sincere mutual willingness among the
parties in conflict to arrive at a constructive compromise.
Negotiations with an enemy who still has potential will not
lead to the establishment of peace, but rather only play into
its hands, allowing him to gain time and regroup his forces.
They give him the possibility of prolonging armed conflict and
of signing a peace accord under favorable terms. Therefore,
damage must be inflicted on the opponent to such a degree
that afterwards it cannot conduct wide-scale combat opera-
tions.
In Afghanistan, the opposition had combat-ready armed units
and all the requirements for seizing power in the country, and
therefore it rejected a peaceful settlement of the conflict; the
policy of national reconciliation proved highly ineffective.
– Civil war may continue until a time when the central authorities
achieve decisive superiority in the balance of power.
Otherwise it takes on a permanent nature, as is observable at
this moment in Afghanistan. In such a situation, an external
force is needed, capable of exerting decisive influence on the
peace process. Such a force is an international peace-making
force, operating under the aegis of the UN, OIC, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the OSCE or
NATO. All the same, the air strikes put into practice in recent
times by NATO forces, for example in Iraq or in Yugoslavia, in
the absence of corresponding decisions in the UN Security
Council, lead to a break-down of the peaceful world order
that has been built-up so far and may lead to a resumption of
the “Cold War,” or even to the Third World War.
– The war in Afghanistan destabilized the situation in the Middle
East. New regions are being pulled into its orbit. The efforts of
Afghan Islamic radicals and extremists to spread the spirit of
“jihad” to neighboring states, including territories populated
by Muslims in the CIS, with the aim of spreading Islamic fun-
damentalism by force, conceal in themselves a real danger
for Central Asian countries and for Russia. The appetites of

























– However, one must bear in mind that Islam is an element of
major importance to culture and lifestyle, a pillar of internal
peace, a criterion of morality and law for millions of people;
clearly in such a delicate situation it is necessary to act in a
detached manner, proceeding from principles, for to avoid
harm is more important than to reap benefits. This was proven
by the sorrowful experience of the “Afghan War”; to forget this
would be to ignore the tragic lessons of history, which
inevitably leads to new wars, new bloodshed, new suffering,
and new tragedies. This applies even more, since practically
all international and internal conflicts are dispersed along the
“arc of crisis” – from North Africa to Central Asia, the main
section of which runs along the line of contact between the
Islamic world and the post-Socialist area (the former
Yugoslavia and the former USSR).
– There is the danger that Russia may be transformed into a buffer
between Christian and Islamic civilization. It is important to
avert antagonism with the Islamic factor in the expanses of
Eurasia, not allowing a clash between Orthodoxy and Islam
(the Orthodox against True Believers).
NOTES
1.  Department of State cable 0621, August 1979.
2. Н.И. Конрад. «Суны-цзы. Трактат о военном искусстве», Издательство
Академии наук СССР, 1950 г., с. 137.
3. Н.И. Конрад. «Суны-цзы. Трактат о военном искусстве», Издательство
Академии наук СССР, 1950 г., с. 85.
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